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JESSE R. HUDSON, Appellant, v. PATRICIA Y.
RAINVILLE, Respondent.
[1] Automobiles-Instructions-Care Toward Pedestrians.-In an
action by a pedestrian against a motorist for
sustained when he was walking along a street, it was proper to
refuse an instruction that the evidence established as a matter
of law that the motorist was guilty of negligence and that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident where
there was testimony that the motorist was blinded by the
clouds suddenly lifting and the sun striking her eyes, and by
the reflection of the sun from the wet pavement, her negligence being a question of fact for the jury under such circumstances.
[2] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether defendant
was guilty of negligence or plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence is ordinarily a question of mixed fact and law,
and may be determined as a matter of law only if reasonable
men following the law can draw but one conclusion from the
evidence presented.
[3] Automobiles- Province of Court and Jury- Contributory
Negligence.-In an action by a pedestrian against a motorist
for injuries sustained when he was walking along a street
pulling a little wagon loaded with a bale of hay, it was proper
to submit to the jury the question whether the pedestrian was
contributively negligent where the jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that in entering on a bottleneck of
narrow pavement and traversing it without looking back for a
period of time sufficient for traffic coming from one direction to
reach him he failed to exercise proper care for his own safety,
particularly where he was familiar with the portions of the
street over which he was traveling and at that hour of the
day traffic was generally heavy.
[4] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Pedestrians.-Pedestrians who
travel over the highways must exercise reasonable care for
their own safety considering the conditions existing, and if
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, § 245 et seq.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, §§ 138, 141; Am.Jur., Negligence,
§§ 344, 348.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 335; [2] Negligence,
§§ 158, 160, 168, 169; [3) Automobiles, § 297(1); [4, 7] Automobiles, § 126; [5] Automobiles, § 125; [6] Automobiles. §§ 293,
371(1).
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of Court and Jury-Contributory Negligence.-

there is room for an honest difference of opinion bemen of averag"
whether plaintiff was neglito look in the direetion from which defendant's
was approaching is a question of fact for the jury,
the finding of the trier of fact is conclusive.
!d.-Contributory Negligence-Pedestrians.--The law does not
arbitrary standards as to what constitutes due care for
own concern when a pedestrian is walking along a street
a little wagon loaded with a bale of hay; it requires
to exercise due care, which means that he must use his
faeultiPs of sight and hearing for that purpose whenever a
prudent man would do so.
PPEAI~

from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sutter
Arthur Coats, Judge. Affirmed.

for damages for personal injuries.
cldcmdant affirmed.

J ndgment for

& Blade, Clewe, Blade & McDonald and Ernest
for Appellant.

Pc'tm's & Peters and ,Jerome D. Peters, ,Jr., for Respondent.

'
I

J.-Prom a judgment in favor of defendant
aft.Pr trial before a jury in an action to recover damages for
injuries, plaintiff appeals.
J'IIarch 6, 1951, about 5 p.m., an accident occurred in
City on B Street. It runs in a generally eastrrly and
direction. Plaintiff lives on the north side of the
street about 300 feet east of the point where the accident
octurred. The street in front of plaintiff's home is paved
with rconcrete and is 5611:; feet from curb to curb.
hundred sixty-six and one half feet west of a path
whid1 leads from plaintiff's house to the sidewalk the concrete pavement abruptly narrows to 25 feet in width with
earth and rock shoulders upon either side.
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There is a concrete sidewalk on the north side of the
street from a point east of plaintiff's home to a point about
60 feet west of it.
The day had been cloudy with intermittent rain and sunshine, and the pavement was wet. The sun was low on the
horizon to the west. Traffic on the portion of B Street where
the accident occurred was generally heavy about 5 p.m., and
this fact was known to plaintiff.
Plaintiff took a bale of hay out of his garage, put it on a
little wagon which he pulled after him as he started toward
his horses which he kept in a fenced pasture just west of
his home and located on the same side of the street.
He followed the sidewalk on the north side to the end
thereof, and proceeded along near the curb for about 200
feet to the point wher~ the street pavement narrowed. Here
he turned left and followed the pavement edge to the point
where the narrow pavement began. At this time he looked
in both directions. He saw a car approaching from the west
several hundred feet away, but saw nothing coming from
the east. He turned right and proceeded to walk west.
All four wheels of the wagon he was pulling were on the north
edge of the 25-foot pavement. After he had gone about
33 feet west from the beginning of the narrow pavement he
was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by defendant. He had not looked back as he walked along the narrow
pavement.
Defendant entered the street at a point east of plaintiff's
home and proceeded west. ·when she arrived in front of
plaintiff's home she saw two automobiles double-parked on
the north side of the street. At this time she was traveling
about 30 miles per hour. As she approached the two parked
cars she saw an automobile coming from the west. She
swerved left to go around the parked cars and then drove
her car back to the right side of the road.
During the moment preceding the accident the only vehicles moving on the street were the automobile coming from
the west and defendant's car.
As defendant came close to the point where the pavement
narrowed and as she turned right into her own lane of travel,
having passed the parked cars, the sun suddenly emerged from
behind the clouds and its direct light and the reflection from
the wet pavement blinded her. She immediately applied her
brakes and threw her hands in front of her face. At approximately the same time she struck plaintiff. At this time
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was traveling about 30 miles per hour and had not seen
until the moment she struck him.
claims the trial court erred :
First: In refusing to give the following instru<Jtion
hC< requesteil,: "You are instructed that the evidence in
case lws establisheil as a matter of law that the defendant
guilty of negligence and that such negligence was the
,:,..,~,1c\rrut:te oouse of the accident here in question.''
instruction was properly refused. There was testimony that defendant was blinded by the clouds suddenly
and the sun striking her eyes; also that she was
m.u1ue:u by the reflection of the sun from the wet pavement.
From the evidence the jury could have found that defendant
was guilty of negligence that proximately and solely caused
the accident in failing to see plaintiff. On the other hand,
the jury could have found that the accident was proximately
solely caused by defendant's being blinded by the rays
sun which suddenly appeared as she p:1ssed the doublecar and turned back to her own lane of travel to
the oncoming car and that her conduct was that of a
rea.stntau.u:: and prudent person in view of the circumstances.
there was a question of fact which the trial court
left for the determination of the trier of fact. {See
v. Fraze, 136 Cal.App.2d 415 at 430 [12] [288 P.2d
; Ribble v. Oook, 111 Cal.App.2d 903 at 907 (2} [245
593); Garcia v. Heaton, 90 Cal.App.2d 591 at 592 [1]
P.2d 560]; and Lenning v. Ohiolo, 63 Cal.App.2d 511
at 515 [3] [147 P.2d 410].)
[2] The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Justice Schauer
in Gray v. Brinkerhoff, 41 Cal.2d 180 at 183 [1) [258 P.2d
, thus: "Whether or not defendant was guilty of negli( citing eases) or plaintiff was guilty of contributory
(citing cases) is ordinarily a question of mixed
aud law and may be determined as a matter of law only
reasonable men following the law can draw but one conclusion from the evidence presented (citing cases).H (Mev. Hendrickson, 58 Cal.App.2d 60, 62 et seq. [136
110]; see also cases cited in 34 West's Cal.Dig. (1951)
287, 290, Negligence, §§ 136(9) a, 136(9) b.)
Huetter v. Andrews, 91 Cal.App.2d 142 [204 P.2d 655],
relied on by plaintiff, is not here in point for the reason that
the cited case there were none of the distracting elements
occurred in the instant ease; that is, there was no evirn 1:~.tacJcJL
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dence of immediate or sudden emergency blinding the
:fendant such as that testified to by defendant here.
[3] Second: In submitting to the jury the question
whether plaintiff was contributively negligent.
The trial judge's ruling was correct. Plaintiff contends
that as a matter of law he was not contributively negligent.
This proposition is not sound. From the evidence the jury
could reasonably conclude that in entering upon the bottleneck of the narrow pavement and traversing it without
looking back :for a period of time sufficient for traffic coming
from the east to reach him, plaintiff was negligent in failing
to exercise proper care for his own safety. Particularly is
this true in view of the evidence that plaintiff was familiar
with the portions of the street over which he was travelirtg
and at that hour of the day traffic was generally heavy,
even though at that particular moment only one car to his
knowledge was using the part of the street which he was
traversing.
[4] Pedestrians, as well as every person who travels over
the highvvays by whatever means must exercise reasonable
care for their own safety, considering the conditions existing.
If they fail in the exercise of such care and tltereby contribute proximately to the cause of any injury they may
sustain as the result of another who has equal rights using
the highway, they are guilty of contributory negligence.
[5] It is not the law that a pedestrian has a right to travel
anywhere upon a public highway and is therefore not negligent in doing so. (Rangel v. Badolato, 133 Cal.App.2d 254
at 266 [284 P.2d 138] .)
[6] Whenever there is room for an honest difference of
opinion between men of average intelligence, the question of
whether plaintiff is negligent in failing to look again in the
direction from which defendant's car is approaching is a
question of fact for the jury, and the finding of the trier of
fact is conclusive. (Salomon v. Meyer, 1 Cal.2d 11 at 15
r2] [32 P.2d 631] ; McQ1Iigg v. Childs, 213 Cal. 661 at 664
[4] [3 P.2d 309] .)
[7] The law does not set arbitrary standards as to what
constitutes due care for one's own concern when a pedestrian
is situated as was plaintiff. It does not say he must look
back, nor that he need never do so. It requires him to exercise due care, which means that he must use his faculties
of sight and hearing for that purpose whenever a reasonably
prudent man would do so. He may go upon the street, but
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or not under the circumstances then existing his
evinces a proper care for his own safety is generally
u.v''"'~" of fact for the determination of the trier of fact.
supra; Hendricks v. Pappas, 82 Cal.
774 at 778
[187 P.2d 436] ;
Hamlin v. Pacijio
150 CaL 776 at 781
P.
.)
C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor,

Schauer, J., and

concurred.
J.-I dissent.
was prejudicial error for the trial court to submit to
the issue of contributory negligence, and the judgshould be reversed on this ground. Under no rational
can it be said that there was any negligence on the
of plaintiff which in any way contributed to the accident here involved. According to the undisputed evidence,
uw·'"""'' ·was walking along the far right side of a street in
a residential district pulling a wagon on which was loaded a
of hay which he was taking· to feed his horses that
were pastured on the right-hand side of the street. It was
the street was straight and visibility good. There
were no sidewalks nor place for him to travel except where
he was. Defendant, driving a car, struck him from the rear.
I
there was no contributory negligence because there was
he, the pedestrian, could have done.
Inasmuch as the street was in a residential section it was
not necessary for him to be traveling along his left side
of it as is required by section 564 of the Vehicle Code when
a person is walking on a road outside a business or residential
district.
The conclusion reached by the majority is contrary to the
following authorities: Wilson v. Kestenholz, 113 Cal.App.
13 [297 P. 954]; Stealey v. Chessttrn, 123 Cal.App. 446 [11
P.2d 428] ; Buchignoni v. DeHaven, 23 Cal.App.2d 76 [72
P.2d 159] ; Keating v. Zumwalt, 91 Cal.App.2d 845 [206
10]; Raymond v. Hill, 168 Cal. 473 [143 P. 743]; Burk
Extrafine Bread Bakery, 208 Cal. 105 [280 P. 522]; and
"'n"'"'~""'u'm, v. Rucker-Fuller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82 [239 P.
41 A.L.R. 1027]. (See also 93 A.L.R. 551; 67 id. 96.)
cases either hold or state that where a pedestrian is in
roadway where he is entitled to be and proceeding forward
the road he has no duty to look to the rear. There
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is nothing for him to do. He may assume that the traffic approaching from his rear will observe him and take proper
precautions especially since the view is unobstructed. Even
.if he looked back there still would be no occasion for him to
do anything as he could assume that any car approaching him
would see him and avoid hitting him.
While the issue of defendant's negligence may have been
one for the jury, the only reasonable conclusion is that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and the jury
should have been instructed accordingly.
The holding of the majority here is in direct conflict with
Gray v. Brinkerhoff, 41 Cal.2d 180 [258 P.2d 834], and the
very recent case of Weeks v. Raper, 139 Cal.App.2d 737
[294 P.2d 178] (hearing denied by this court on May 2,
1956).
While the evidence here is such that reasonable minds
might differ on the issue of defendant's negligence, this cannot be true as to plaintiff's conduct, which was entirely blameless under the law applicable to one in his position.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 6,
1956. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

